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In 1914, while the numerically superior and better armed South African forces were
invading German South West Africa, the seriously outmanned German commander,
Major Viktor Franke, had to send a company of sixty Schutztruppe (‘‘protection
troops’’) to the Grootfontein district to deal with troublesome Bushmen. The
unpublished journal/memoir of one of these troopers, Gunther Walbaum, provides
vivid documentation of what happened on these ‘‘Bushman patrols.’’ His commander
instructed him as follows: ‘‘I would be glad if you will not kill too many [Bushmen] if
possible. Only kill them when there is an attack, but use your own discretion.’’1
The banality of these hunts is obvious from Walbaum’s description:
After three kilometers we reached an open field where Jan [the guide] showed us to go
down. One kilometer in front of us some Bushmen were busy digging out uintjies
[tubers]. Now Jan did not want to walk in front anymore, because he did not want to
have anything to do with the shooting. We discussed our next step for a moment so that
we could encircle them. We had to sneak up to them like one does with game. On a sign,
we all got up with our guns ready to shoot. We were about fifty to seventy meters away
from them. The Bushmen stood in astonishment. When we approached them, ten
or twelve men ran away. Falckenburg and one of our natives shot two. Unfortunately,
I missed.2
Indeed, death was often preferable to capture:
Jonas [a prisoner] said he did not know Sus [a farm that had been raided recently by
Bushmen], well, he did not want to know Sus, but the women said they saw him as he
cut the boy’s heart out. [Note: This is not verified by court records.] The people were
asked how many people were involved and how many guns they had, as well as who had
killed the other [white] farmer. They said nothing. I hit them until the blood was
running down [in streams]. They behaved badly and said their brothers would kill us
all. I told them I would get them all. At night I tied each one naked to a tree. It was ice
cold and they stood far from the fire; they tried to untie themselves with their feet.
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The watchman hit them all over with a sjambock [hippo-hide whip]. At four o’clock in
the morning—the coldest time of the night—they started begging: ‘‘Mister, if you bring
us to the fire we will say everything.’’ I told them that they had to wait because I was
sure they were not mistreated enough.
At five o’clock we untied them. Jonas told us everything, but his bad behavior he did not
change. The woman stayed near the fire with her child during the night. All the men
had bad lacerations on their shoulders from trying to untie themselves by rubbing their
shoulders on the bark of the tree.
At eight o’clock we took the scoundrels to the bush where we found the right trees in no
time. A few boxes were piled up, ropes were tied onto branches—the men were put on
the boxes with their hands tied and ropes placed around their necks. We kicked
the boxes over and they were dead in seconds, because their necks were broken. All four
of them had burst veins in the lower leg after they died. In twenty minutes they were
dead. The women we took to Wiesental [a farm].3
One of the first orders of business of the newly installed South African
administration in 1915 was to ban ‘‘Bushman hunting.’’ The instructions of the
secretary for South-West Africa were explicit:
It is necessary in the interests of all to secure a truce and bring the belligerents back to
reason. The farmers must be told that shooting of Bushmen will no longer be permitted
and will be prosecuted with all the rigour of the law. The Bushmen must be informed in
like manner.4
But so traumatic was Bushman experience of German brutality that, three years after
the German defeat, the South African military magistrate of Grootfontein felt duty
bound to break protocol and write directly to the secretary of the Protectorate.
Magistrate Gage described how he encountered some Bushmen prisoners who
were trembling so much that I remarked on it to the Gaoler. Later they were brought
before him under an escort with fixed bayonets, and their terror was pitiful to
behold. . . . It is like catching a bird in your hand when you can see its heart throbbing
against its breast and you know that unless it is soon released it will die of sheer terror.5
Walbaum’s acts were not those of a few miscreants; they were systemic.
This article focuses on genocide in Namibia. Not the much-heralded, if
problematic, Herero genocide of 1904, but one that is more invidious because it has
effectively been made invisible and forgotten. While German mistreatment of the
Herero provoked a public outcry in Germany and Europe and led to large-scale
government reforms—moving the colonial apparatus from naked coercion to scientific
colonialism, epitomized by the founding of the Colonial Institute in Hamburg in 1908—
the genocide with which this article is concerned was hardly heeded, apart from one or
two isolated voices of protest. Indeed, so successful has this process of ‘‘invisibilization’’
been that even scholars with expertise on those labeled Bushmen or San, when
discussing the vulnerability of indigenous peoples to genocide, ignore this earlier
history.
Contemporary anthropologists specializing in the San6 have largely overlooked
the long history of denigratory academic involvement with those labeled ‘‘Bushmen.’’7
Even genocide scholars specializing in Namibia ignore the Bushman or San
case, ostensibly on the grounds that no one has done research on this issue.8
Popular histories of the destruction of tribal or indigenous peoples also seem to forget
this dark moment. Ironically, nowadays Bushmen themselves do not recall this
genocide.9
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This silence might have serious consequences. Recently the prominent and
influential Herero historian Dr. Zedekia Ngavirue weighed in on the debate about
Herero genocide and the claims for German reparations; he reportedly
dispelled the confusion of ‘‘other people’’ having suffered. He said it is true that the
numbers of Namas were reduced with some having been taken to countries like Togo
and Cameroon. He said it was equally true that some Damaras were on the side of
the Ovaherero and that some Oshiwambo fought on the side of the Ovaherero like
Chief Nehale ka Mpingana of Ondonga.
However, Ngavirue said the German army only issued the Genocide Order against the
Ovaherero, only Ovaherero land was confiscated wholesale and only Ovaherero leaders
were hanged. All these, he said, pointed out to a clear German agenda against
the Ovaherero.
He said the German government keeps referring to ‘‘others’’ to avoid facing
the Ovaherero squarely while purporting to acknowledge the atrocities inflicted on
the Ovaherero.10
It is not that the Bushman genocide in Namibia was unknown. Indeed, the
(in)famous 1918 Blue Book detailing Germany’s treatment of the indigenes made much
of it.11 Lawrence Green, a South African journalist who did much to create the popular
settler image of Namibia in his numerous books (which were reprinted many times and
carried such romantic titles as Lords of the Last Frontier and Where Men Still Dream)
frequently mentioned that Bushmen were shot on sight by the Germans;12 American
travelers such as Sidney Legendre and Negley Farson aver the same.13 German
settlers and travelers all acknowledged the genocidal actions. Lydia Ho¨pker,
reminiscing about her days as a farmer in the Grootfontein-Otavi area writes of a
neigbor, Frau Keller, showing her a Bushman child in her care, the result of a punitive
expedition against Bushmen that had killed many and taken numerous prisoners.
Ho¨pker includes a photograph of ‘‘captured Bushmen’’ in her book, and writes
that ‘‘orphaned Bushmen children were divided among German farmers wives
who cared for them and later used them as personal servants.’’14 In outer districts,
she avers, one could never be certain about one’s life when meeting Bushmen, who
hid and shot poisoned arrows at both whites and native shepherds; she then goes
on to detail numerous instances of settler paranoia concerning Bushman attacks,
including an experience of her own when her tea was ostensibly poisoned. Others
concurred.15
Ghosts in the Graveyard: Apparitions beyond the Limelight
Part of the reason for this invisibilization is precisely the narrow focus on the so-called
Herero Genocide, often touted as the ‘‘first genocide of the twentieth century’’ or the
‘‘first modern genocide.’’16 A closer examination shows that hostilities did not break out
in January 1904 and cease in 1907 but started in 1903 and petered out into continuous
police action that persisted right up to the South African invasion in 1915. This focus
has led to such a single-minded emphasis that events slightly out of focus are ignored.
This article is concerned with the turbulent wake or afterglow of the ‘‘official war.’’
This is where things get interesting, if not scary.
Once we remove that ethnocentric framing device called ‘‘the twentieth century,’’
it is obvious that the ‘‘Herero Genocide’’ had more in common with the late-nineteenth-
century colonial wars of annihilation—such as the Mashonaland wars of 1897 and
some of the ‘‘Zulu’’ wars17—or even with what was happening contemporaneously in
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the Belgian Congo and with the US invasion of the Philippines, than with the
classic defining genocides of the twentieth century. It was a defining moment in
Namibian history, however, insofar as it led to the transformation of a ‘‘weak’’
colonial state into a ‘‘strong’’ one, and it was under the latter, with its laws and
bureaucrats and pretensions to scientific colonial administration, that the machinery
was put in place for implementing genocide against ‘‘bandits’’ and other ‘‘forager’’
groups such as the so-called Bushmen. It was in the context of a Musterstaat
(‘‘model state’’), as Zimmerer18 felicitously calls it, that a lot of the dirty work of
genocide got done.
In Germany, some of the major objections to the war had been its high cost to
the German taxpayer and its destructive impact on the supply of cheap labor.19
Colonies had to be made to pay for themselves, which contributed directly to further
exploitation of indigenous peoples. To facilitate this economic self-sufficiency, decision-
making power gradually devolved from Berlin to the settlers. In 1909a Landesrat, an
advisory body consisting of fifteen elected and fifteen appointed members, was
established in Windhoek. The Landesrat had to jointly approve any regulations
concerning ‘‘Native Affairs.’’20 Horst Drechsler has famously termed the period after
the 1904–1907 war the ‘‘peace of the graveyard.’’21 Yet, for all the deathly silence of
historians on this age, it was a time when many ghosts were abroad. It was a period
of economic boom for the settlers. Diamonds were discovered in Luderitzbucht in 1908;
the fabulously rich Tsumeb copper mine was expanding, and the completion of
railroads leading to the mine made access much easier for settlers and entrepreneurs.
Between 1907 and 1911 the settler population almost doubled, from 7,110 to 13,962.22
Transfer of resources continued apace. Land placed under settlers’ control increased
from 4.4% of total landmass in 1903 to 13% in 1910. To put it differently, the number of
European farms increased from 458 farm units totaling 4.8 million hectares (mil ha) in
1904 to 1,331 farm units totaling 13.4mil ha in 1913. Settlers were also amassing
animal wealth: the number of cattle owned by Europeans increased from 52,531 in
1907 to 205,643 in 1913, while small stock under European ownership increased
from 208,480 to 1,011,697.23 While farmers and smallholders numbered only 1,390 in
1911, there were also some 2,572 artisans and miners; 1,035 merchants, shopkeepers,
and innkeepers; and slightly fewer than 900 civil servants.24
Both the mining industry and settlers demanded cheap labor, a rather scarce
commodity given the infamous Vernichtigungsbefehl (‘‘annihilation order’’) issued
by Lothar von Trotha in 1904. Indeed Moritz Bonn, a young liberal economist
who had gone out to South Africa in 1906 to field-test Hobson’s theory of imperialism
and subsequently made a three-month trip to explore conditions in Namibia,
complained that
though the country has regularly been called a white man’s country, most manual work
is carried out by native labour. . .. the real problem . . . has always been not only how to
find the white man to settle the country, but quite as much how to find coloured
labourers to support them when settled.25
So desperate were settlers for inexpensive labor that larger employers were forced to
recruit laborers from South Africa, while efforts to recruit labor from other German
colonies failed and importing Chinese and Indian labor was seriously considered.26
In such a situation, recruiting labor from Owamboland, an area to the north of
the Etosha Game Park, became a major priority. The number of Owambo contract
laborers tripled from about 4,000 in 1908 to 11,764 by 1914.27 These laborers, however,
had to traverse an area inhabited by San or Bushmen.
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The German administration did its utmost to facilitate the ‘‘internal’’ labor supply
as well, by way of a series of draconian Verordnungen (ordinances) issued by Governor
Friedrich von Lindequist in August 1907, which allowed for indigenous inhabitants to
be stripped of their property (largely land and livestock). Once they were deprived
of their ‘‘traditional livelihood,’’ it was assumed that they would be forced into
the colonial workforce. Indigenes had to apply to the governor for permission to
own livestock. Another set of regulations sought to control their movements through
‘‘pass laws’’: people were required to wear brass tokens around their necks, a central
register of natives was to be developed, and work contracts were regulated. Settlers
were given the right to engage in ‘‘fatherly chastisement’’ of their workers. Lastly, and
ominously for Bushmen, it was decreed that ‘‘natives who are loitering, may be
punished as vagrants, when they can show no means of support.28 These three sets
of regulations locked together in a mutually supporting way to forcibly incorporate
indigenous people into the settler-controlled economy. In September 1907, commenting
on the Eingeborenen-Verordnungen (‘‘Indigenous Ordinances’’), the Windhuker
Nachtrichten said,
The native must be made aware that he has a right to exist only in direct dependence
on the territorial authorities; without this, he is in a certain sense an outlaw: a
livelihood outside of working for whites is not available to him.29
Directly and indirectly, this legislation facilitated the genocide of a people whose
mode of existence was defined by the state as vagrancy or outlawry.
The bitter reality for settlers was that they were faced with a critical labor crisis of
their own making and had to make do with Bushman labor, no matter how
unsatisfactory they alleged it to be. By 1908 police and military patrols were rounding
up Bushmen and allocating them to farmers as laborers. The mines also required
labor: a military patrol from the Waterberg rounded up some fifty Bushmen in the
vicinity of Tsumeb and transferred them to the mines as laborers.30 In 1910, the Outjo
District Council decided that all Bushmen in the district should report for work, and,
ultimately, police succeeded in rounding up more than 100.31 Of the 2,829 Bushmen
enumerated in the 1912 Grootfontein census, some 997 were already listed as working
for settlers. Trooper Walbaum also observed that most of the farm laborers in the
district were Bushmen.
As part of the effort to implement these laws, the territory underwent
administrative re-organization and the formalization of the bureaucracy. The
number of administrative districts increased from six in 1903 to sixteen in 1914.
The establishment of a police zone in the north and a Sperrgebiet (‘‘prohibited area’’) in
the Namib Desert served to concentrate the settler population in the center of the
country. While the military was reduced in size from 3,988 in 1907/1908 to 1,970 in
1912, a police force was created in 1905 to fill the vacuum. In 1907 it consisted
of eighty-four Europeans at thirty-two stations;32 by 1913 the police force consisted of
at least twenty-eight sergeant majors, 532 Europeans, and 370 native police based
at 111 stations.33
Not only the significant expansion in European settlement after the official ending
of the 1904–1907 war but also the location of these settlers is important. One of the
magnet areas was the northeastern district of Grootfontein, where a higher rainfall
and many springs made the area attractive to smallholders. The extension of the
railway line to the nearby Tsumeb copper mine, with its ready market, further
served to enhance the area’s appeal for settlers and speculators. Of the various
towns and districts in Namibia, Grootfontein displayed the most rapid growth
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between 1911 and 1913. More telling, though, was the expansion of European farms in
the district, from twenty-five in 1904 to 173 in 1913, encompassing 777,077 ha.
The number of settler-owned cattle in the district increased from 7,600 in 1908 to
13,611 in 1912.34 Outjo District, lying directly adjacent to Grootfontein experienced a
similar expansion with some 431,125ha occupied by farms. This area was not terra
nullius but, rather, the traditional habitat of Bushmen. If police are stationed where
the trouble is, then these two districts were clearly the epicenter. By 1907 Grootfontein
already boasted the single largest contingent of police—some eighty-two personnel,
including one warrant officer and nine sergeants. In 1912 that dubious honor fell to
Outjo.35
These developments were indicative of, and led to, violence. As Stals points out, by
1910 the only real security problems for settlers in the colony were the Bondelswarts,
part of the legacy of the 1904–1907 war in the far south, and the Bushmen in the
north and east.36 A few murders of Owambo and German settlers by Bushmen led to
an outcry in the settler press. Headlines like ‘‘Bushman Pestilence,’’ ‘‘Bushman
Plague,’’ and ‘‘Bushman Danger’’ were common coinage. Powerful forces, namely the
Luderitzbucht Chamber of Mines and the various farmers’ organizations, called on the
government to act. Especially egregious to the mining industry was an attack on some
sixty-nine returning Owambo contract workers, which they felt would disrupt the
labor supply. Energetic disciplinary action was called for, thundered the Su¨dwest-
Zeitung, claiming that it was outrageous that two Bushmen armed with bows and
arrows could put to flight a group of thirty Owambo contract workers, with an obvious,
if unstated, impact on labor recruitment.37 Reinforcements and ‘‘mobile’’ police
stations were necessary.
Similarly, the Deutsche-Kolonialzeitung complained in of attacks on Owambo
migrant-contract laborers and reported that the Grootfontein District Council had, by
a large majority, voted to place non-working Bushmen on a reserve on the other side of
the Police Zone, an area beyond that recently occupied by European settlers.38
Captured Bushmen were to be sent to work in the diamond mines in Ludertizbucht.
These suggestions received a sympathetic hearing in the colonial press and among
officials.39
The supposedly liberal Governor Theodor Seitz, advised by Native Commissioner
Kurt Streitwolf, also a ‘‘liberal,’’40 opted for a strong-arm strategy, increasing the
number and power of police and military units in the troubled area and proclaiming,
inter alia,
1. When patrol officers of the police are searching Bushmen areas, breaking up
their settlements or searching for cattle thieves and robber bands, they must have
their weapons ready to fire at all times, using of course the utmost caution.
2. Firearms are to be used in the slightest case of insubordination against officials.
When a felon is either caught in the act, or when being hunted down, ‘‘does not stop
on command’’ but tries to escape through flight.
3. The native police servant who is accompanying or guiding a patrol may carry a
firearm, model 71 (Mauser rifle) with full responsibility in all areas where the
Bushmen live.
The way in which State officials are to act towards Bushmen is regulated by the
following rules. Even though it may be difficult, one should strive to keep the Bushmen
at work. Forced dislocation of a Bushman werft [encampment] may only take place
if they have been stealing stock or robbing or have attacked Europeans or their native
workers . . .
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If some of the male Bushmen who have been arrested are strong enough to work,
they should be handed over to the district authorities at Luderitzbucht to work in the
Diamond Fields.41
Seitz’s immediate subordinates felt that these draconian measures did not go
far enough. More specifically, the commander of the Schutztruppe felt that the
Verordnung was unsatisfactory because the term ‘‘felon’’ would raise problems;
he urged that the proclamation be amended to state that any Bushman who did not
stop on command could be shot. Since it was impossible to say from which werft
(loosely, ‘‘encampment’’_) the alleged culprit came, he said, ‘‘it was nearly futile not to
break up and arrest the members of all the settlements in the area where the patrol is
operating.’’ The district commandant of Outjo went even further: he wanted to include
women in the definition of Bushmen, as they ‘‘were just as dangerous.’’ Only one
district commandant, Beringar van Zastrow of Grootfontein, felt that Seitz’s measures
were too draconian, but even his protests were muted.
Given the broad interpretation of what constituted the ‘‘slightest case of
insubordination,’’ or even the Germans’ dubious linguistic capacity to tell Bushmen
to stop ‘‘on command’’ and the fact that it was common knowledge that Bushmen fled
at the sight of any patrol, this Verordnung constituted, in effect, as later events
were to show, a warrant for genocide. Insofar as it was crucial in providing a legal
underpinning for sustained purposeful action by officials and settlers to carry out a
policy referred to in the settler press and administration as ‘‘Ausrottung’’ (extermina-
tion), this was more than simply an episodic massacre or pogrom; it was embedded
within settler society. Of course, the creation of the United Nations Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was still several decades away
at the time of these events, but, like genocide scholar Helen Fein, I treat this as
a sociological genocide. All the facilitative characteristics for genocide were present—
deep structural divisions, identifiable victim groups, legitimating hate ideology and a
breakdown of moral restraints, and what we might call ‘‘audience obliviousness’’
(toleration by local, national, and international communities).42
Action was indeed thorough. The governor’s annual report for 1911–1912 notes
that in that year alone police, often supported by soldiers, undertook more than
400 Bushman patrols in the Grootfontein, Outjo, Rehoboth, and Maltahohe districts,
covering some 60,000 km2. Attempts at controlling vagrants, mostly Bushmen,
by issuing metal ‘‘dog tag’’ passes were so unsuccessful that settlers, the press, and
the Landesrat discussed the possibility of tattooing Bushman vagrants, but this
suggestion was dropped, largely because of ‘‘technical difficulties’’ and the possibility of
public outcry in Germany.43
Still, the ‘‘Bushman problem’’ did not go away. In April 1912, Seitz addressed the
Landesrat, acknowledging that there were still many difficulties because of robberies
committed by Bushmen in the Grootfontein, Outjo, and Maltahohe Districts and
that there was a need to further increase punishment.44 By early 1912, the area
west of the Etosha Pan had been ‘‘cleansed’’ of Bushmen and the police station at
Okakeujo reinforced with additional personnel. Attacks on Owambo migrant workers,
however, continued to such an extent that the Luderitzbucht Chamber of Mines
urgently requested the government to ‘‘please be so kind as to immediately
start with the sanitization of the Bushman hordes in that area.’’45 The Chamber
of Mines was supported by the Outjo district head, Dr. Schultze-Jena, who proposed
that all Bushmen in his district be forcibly removed to the coast. The
governor vetoed this suggestion, both because of the cost, which was estimated at
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between 50,000 and 60,000 marks per annum, and out of concern that such a strategy
might draw unwelcome public criticism in Germany; more specifically, there would be
a ‘‘very undesirable public discussion if natives who have not broken the law were to be
removed as prisoners to an area where the climate would kill many of them.’’46
The troops sent to deal with these raids found it almost impossible to control the
Bushmen, who could easily escape into the thick bush with its many hidden springs.
The only workable solution, the governor believed, was to provide military escorts
to Owambo workers.47
A short while later, the acting head of Grootfontein District, Otto Link, urgently
requested that the governor deport all the collected Bushmen to the Luderitzbucht
diamond fields. Moreover, he urged, the military should assist, as the police were too
few to undertake preventive patrols. Now was the time for raids against the Bushmen,
he felt, as they were congregated around waterholes for the winter prior to the rains. A
negative response from Windhoek did not stop Link from proposing the same total
deportation or ‘‘cleansing’’ policy for his district the very next year, in response to a
unanimous petition from the local Farmers Union, which begged the Kaiser to
undertake the ‘‘most stringent possible measures to end the present situation’’ because
life and possessions of farmers were in ‘‘high danger’’ from ‘‘every Bushman from the
Otjijita Mountains to Nurugas who are nomadic.’’48 This time the governor, angered by
the murder of two white settlers by Bushmen, agreed, and thirty additional troops
were seconded to deal specifically with the ‘‘Bushman danger.’’ A short while later,
Link reported that the Army’s 4th Company had managed to kill ten Bushmen and
capture thirty.49
Official documentation is suggestive about the atmosphere reigning in
Grootfontein settler circles. In a sworn deposition in a court case tried by the
South Africans, one Farmer Thomas averred,
In 1911 I had a fight with Bushmen. I shot one and wounded, I believe, three or four.
I was never tried by a German court for having shot these Bushmen. I have
accompanied the German police and troops when they used to hunt Bushmen but I do
not know how many Bushmen I shot then.50
In early 1915, Farmer K. Boehme of Kakuse West wrote to Governor Seitz
concerning the problem of labor and the ‘‘more burning question’’ of how to protect
settlers from Bushmen. Although he had given his Bushman laborers meat, they had
run away and then attempted to drive off livestock, but he and some Herero tracked
them for about 7km:
There we found a fire with five Bushmen sitting around it. Unfortunately, they ran
away too soon because of my dogs. But one was grabbed by my dogs and prevented from
fleeing. He then grabbed for his bow and arrows but was stopped by my twelve-year-old
Herero helper who called for help whereupon I fired. I recognized the corpse to my
astonishment as [illegible] the Bushman [illegible] who had been taken to Tsumeb
about three weeks ago. My two Herero assistants claimed to recognize all five Bushmen
[illegible]. . . . (Included a ca. seven-year-old) . . . I have repeatedly requested the
competent District Office to deport the Bushmen or to kill them off [abschiessen].
It seems that I will only get an answer to the Bushman question if I write directly to the
Imperial Government or to the Colonial Office.51
Boehme was friendly with another farmer, Karl Wilhelm Becker, who in 1916 was
charged with murder, having killed two male and four female Bushmen (two of them
children) when he surprised them eating his ox. He was accompanied by a farm
laborer, a Bushman named Max, who said he had ‘‘not reported the matter to the police
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because I was afraid the Boss would have killed me if I did so. I ran away when we got
to the house. I ran to the Sandveld because if I went towards the Police Station the
master might have found me on the road and shot me.’’ Becker openly boasted about
his Bushman-hunting exploits to the police. The South Africans found him guilty of
murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment, citing as mitigating circumstances
the fact that the German administration had condoned such killings.52
Captured Bushmen were usually deported to the coast to work in cold and damp
conditions at Swakopmund and Luderitzbucht, and sometimes in the mines at
Tsumeb.53 Hard statistics are difficult to come by, but some indicators are available.
A letter from the Grootfontein District secretary reports twenty-seven Bushman men,
twenty-four women, and twenty-four children captured. Of these, twelve men, two
children, and two women were being sent to Swakopmund. The women were wives of
men killed in skirmishes with troops, and it was assumed that they would hate settlers
and perpetuate acts of brigandage. One survey of Bushman prisoners in Swakopmund
lists thirty-two, of whom fifteen died within a year.54
Booty Capitalism
Karl Marx, of course, called this process of accumulation by dispossession ‘‘primitive
accumulation.’’ Noting the contemporary ubiquity of ‘‘primitive accumulation,’’ , David
Harvey prefers the term ‘‘accumulation by dispossession.’’55 Max Weber was also
concerned with social processes of this nature, which he termed ‘‘booty capitalism’’
or ‘‘adventure capitalism,’’ a rather daring and ruthless predatory form of capitalism in
which profit is made possible by direct force or domination. It was, said Weber, a
largely unethical capitalism, inspired by the ‘‘inner attitude of the adventurer, which
laughs at all ethical limitations. . . . Absolute and conscious ruthlessness in acquisition
has often stood in the closest connection with the strictest conformity to tradition.’’56
A characteristic emphasized by neither Marx nor Weber—nor, indeed, most
works on colonial genocide—concerns demographics.57 In such booty-capitalist or
‘‘primitive accumulative’’ moments, there is typically a severe gender imbalance.
Men overwhelmingly predominate. Leaving aside the sizeable male military presence
in German South West Africa in 1912, there were 9,046 adult male Europeans over
fifteen, of whom only 2,438 were married. Of those claiming to be married, 1,970 had
European wives living with them, 421 claimed absentee European wives, and forty-
seven were married to ‘‘coloreds.’’58 Immediately before World War I, settler gender
balance reached its most equitable, with one woman for every five men.59
During this period, there were five factors relevant to a proclivity to violence,
factors that, in certain combinations, can produce a lethal cocktail for potential
violence, including genocidal violence. First, and most importantly, as David
Courtwright has shown, wherever there are large concentrations of single men,
violence in its various manifestations is endemic.60 Colonial writers often took a
certain pride in the violent colonial ethos.61 Violence was both action and attitude.
After a visit to Luderitzbucht, prospector Fred Cornell described the treatment
of Herero and Nama prisoners:
I had seen something of this myself, and had heard more from ex-German soldiers
themselves, who with extraordinary callousness used to show whole series of illustrated
postcards, depicting wholesale executions and similar gruesome doings to death of these
poor natives. One of these, that enjoyed great vogue at the time, showed a line of ten
Hottentots dangling from a single gallows. And each and every German soldier in the
photo was striking an attitude and smirking towards the camera in pleasurable
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anticipation of the fine figure he would cut when the photo was published.
This, I repeat, was only one of many that enjoyed a big sale in German South-West
for the delectation of admiring friends in the Father-land. Absolutely no mercy was
shown to these unfortunate creatures . . .62
Such everyday visual acceptance—and, indeed, active encouragement—to treat the
other as decidedly inferior was an important factor in creating and sustaining the local
Zeitgeist in which genocide could occur.
The second factor relates to sex. Some contemporary accounts estimate that 90% of
all white men lived in so-called concubinage relationships; while such relationships
might have dampened disorder and violence, it was government policy to actively
discourage them, especially after 1904.63 At the same time, such relationships
precipitated violence. The first South African military magistrate in the Grootfontein
District admitted, ‘‘It seems that the Bushmen have lost all faith in the white man’s
methods [of justice], more especially as their women were being constantly interfered
with by both farmers and police.’’64 Major T.L. O’Reilly, the military magistrate who
drafted the Blue Book on Germany’s treatment of the natives, concluded that, based
on evidence from missionaries and German officials and statements by natives,
‘‘The chief cause of all the trouble between Germans and Bushmen was that the
Germans would persist in taking the Bushwomen from their husbands and using them
as concubines.’’65 He also cited Johannes Kruger, described as ‘‘an intelligent Cape
Bastard,’’ who in 1895 was appointed by Governor Leutwein as ‘‘Chief of the natives of
Grootfontein,’’ as claiming that ‘‘the whole district is full of these German-Bushwomen
cross-breeds.’’66 This, in turn, generated fears of Bushman ‘‘Retribution,’’ which
settlers believed was best pre-empted by killing.
A third factor relating to the demographic imbalance concerns alcohol, the misuse
of which is generally a valid indicator of social disorder. Alcohol consumption among
settlers was striking. In 1903, of the 167 firms and companies licensed in the
Schutzgebiet, one-third were involved with the alcohol trade. By 1913, there was one
commercial drinking establishment for every seventy-eight Europeans; Windhoek,
with a population of 500 Europeans, had fourteen public bars—approximately one bar
for every forty-one settlers.67 Tellingly, there was some criticism of settlers’ excessive
alcohol consumption, especially from the so-called moral purity movements in
Germany.68 A Dr. Warneck, for example, complained that beer consumption in the
Schutzgebiet was 50% higher than in Germany.69 Others noted complaints that
farmers would consume champagne for any slight occasion, despite having to pay
twenty marks for a bottle; they drank it like soda water and called it ‘‘Farmer
Weisse.’’70 Discussing unsuccessful horticultural smallholders, Clara Brockmann
suggested that many failed not only because of ‘‘inactivity’’ and ‘‘stubbornness’’ but
also as a result of ‘‘playing the great gentleman’’ and ‘‘drinking themselves to ruin by
buying rounds of champagne.’’71 Alcohol numbs the sense of bourgeois decency;
the breakdown of ‘‘moral restraints’’ in facilitating mass killing is well known, and
excessive alcohol consumption is generally associated with such breakdowns.72
Fourth, the socioeconomic background of all these rather virile male settlers
needs to be considered. This is important, given Weber’s insight about
the connection between adventure capitalism and its ‘‘closest connection with the
strictest conformity to tradition.’’ Recalling his visit to the Schutzgebiet, Moritz Bonn
observed,
In South-West Africa, we have created a kind of manorial system with a European
lord of the manor and an African serf. . . . You quickly drift into European problems . . .
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but whatever you do on African soil will always be merely ‘‘semi-European.’’
The democracies you create are not a people, but merely a class, whose progress,
existence and safety depends on the services of a subject race which they cannot
amalgamate, but which they must rule. There lies . . . the labour foundation of the
African society.73
Most of the junior officials Bonn encountered
were scions of the Prussian nobility who had not learned much and who were suspicious
of every kind of learning. They had come out to Africa because it offered them a chance
of bossing on a scale no longer available even in darkest Pomerania.74
The Schutztruppe contained a high proportion of officers descended from distinguished
military families,75 and their legacy lives on in the form of the fake Rhenish castles and
massive monuments that are so popular with tourists nowadays. Even the
missionaries Bonn found disappointing: ‘‘Their small-town minds had been trained
in that docile obedience which was a distinctive feature of German Lutheranism; they
did not dare to stand up for the rights of the natives or even for their own work.’’76 This
mindset of arrogance combined with unquestioning acceptance of orders, or of the
dictates of science, helped facilitate the exercise of killing people defined as ‘‘lesser,’’
whether for the purposes of massacre or of genocide.
The fifth consequence of the demographics of settler society, as Courtwright
suggests, concerns the important role of widespread rumors.77 Rumors were especially
apt to generate insecurity when the settlers were thinly scattered on the ground.
Paranoia was widely recognized. As Walbaum’s commander advised, ‘‘The people out
there will have some gruesome stories to tell you, but only half of them are true.’’78
Undoubtedly the situation bred a remarkable paranoia. Indeed, Jan-Bart Gewald sees
paranoia as a major factor leading to the German–Herero War, and Isobel Hull reports
that even General von Trotha suffered from fantasies in which he doubted the
magnitude of the dying and believed that the Herero had simply vanished and would
return to fight.79 Paranoia manifests and infiltrates the business of living in various
subtle ways. While the laws were draconian, their effectiveness was constantly
doubted, and attempts to ensure more regularization through the plethora of rules
and regulations controlling indigenes served only to exacerbate the situation.80
The administration soon realized this:
[I]t will frequently be found that natives who are actually vagrants are in possession of
registration badges, these are obtained from other natives or stolen. Care should
therefore be taken that proper proof of employment is produced and that the native is in
possession of his own registration badge.81
The colonial wars in Namibia between 1903 and 1907 were subject to extensive
media scrutiny,82 at least in the early stages, or until the conflict began to drag out into
a long and costly low-intensity guerrilla war, largely in the south and in the northeast.
Abuses by settlers and officials led to sufficient public outcry that the Social Democrats
and the various Catholic parties in the Reichstag were able to impose some controls on
colonial affairs. Colonizers became acutely conscious that their actions were subject to
careful scrutiny and criticism in the metropole. Comments like those made in 1906
by one Dr. Schaedler in the Reichstag obviously had an impact on settlers:
The story of our colonies contains a whole series of events of a not too pleasant kind;
embezzlements, falsifying of evidence, senseless cruelties, assaults on women, horrible
ill-treatment—things that do not contribute to a laurel wreath. The colonies must be no
dumping ground for second-rate people.83
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Fear of criticism influenced how they treated strangers who might be critical.
Bonn, for example, found that on his 1907 visit, officials and many settlers refused to
assist him in his inquiries until he threatened to make their lack of cooperation a
matter of public record.84 Settlers and officials had reason to be suspicious of meddling
metropolitan types because of the claims made in the Reichstag by one of its leading
members, August Bebel, in 1905 to the effect that it was difficult for people to send
unpopular reports to Europe and Germany about the administration there because if it
became known who the individual was, ‘‘his entire existence is placed in jeopardy.’’85
Similarly, for economic reasons, colonial civil servants, unlike their metropolitan
counterparts, lacked tenure and thus were discouraged from questioning or taking
a stand against abuses, and from criticizing their superiors, by the fear of losing
their jobs.86
The Musterstaat as Ceremonial State
The situation in German South-West Africa was rife with contradictions. Settlers
hated the indigenes yet depended on them; they disliked the government but relied
heavily on it. In such circumstances, there was a strong emphasis—indeed, some
visitors felt, an overemphasis—on ritual and ceremonialism. On a 1913 visit, South
African anthropologist A. Winifred Hoernle complained, ‘‘It is awkward having
anything to do with the Germans because rank counts so much and one can’t get to
the individual direct.’’87 Excessive formality can disguise many features, including
ignorance. The Weltanschauung of such persona, I suggest, had two important
consequences. First, it produced an excessive reliance on the letter of the law; second,
it meant that the words of academics and scholars carried a certain, often exaggerated,
authority. Both were crucial factors in the Bushman genocide.
Ritual plays a crucial role both in coping with uncertainty and insecurity at
the individual level and in state formation at the collective level. The casual observer
of colonial photographs88 is struck by the immense time, money, and effort spent on
secular ritual. Many have argued that inculcating awe and respect for the colonizer
was more important than force as a means of ruling, and here ‘‘invented traditions,’’
such as commemorative events, frequently justified by monuments, were especially
important. Certainly they were deployed for such purposes in Namibia, given the
fractured and politically divisive nature of the Namibian settler community. While
Helmust Bley is undoubtedly correct in noting their emotional and political impact
upon indigenes,89 my concern here is to note their impact on the colonials as well.
Often ignored but crucial were the day-to-day rituals, and, indeed, this was where
natives experienced the state. There was a veritable industry for socializing intending
settlers, which covered the gamut from Handbucher fu¨r Auswanderungslustige
(handbooks for those intending to travel abroad) to special schools in Germany, and
‘‘proper’’ interracial etiquette featured prominently.90 Laws underwrote seemingly
trivial daily interaction rituals of subordination for indigenes, such as prohibiting
indigenes from walking on sidewalks and forcing them to greet settlers respectfully
and not to make loud noises. Laws also reinforced certain stereotypes. Consider the
va¨terliches Zu¨chtigungsrecht, the law of paternal chastisement. This meshed well
with the notion that indigenes were like dependent children who had to be disciplined
in order to become well brought up, a notion lent added credence by the fact that in
Germany corporal punishment was allowed only in schools and in the home.
Given the shortage of personnel to enforce compliance, interaction rituals between
colonizer and colonized took on an added dimension. The colonial situation calls forth
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exaggerated etiquette from both colonizer and colonized. According to Albert Memmi,
‘‘formalism is the cyst into which colonial society shuts itself and hardens, degrading
its own life in order to save it. It is a spontaneous action of self-defense, a means of
safeguarding the collective consciousness.’’91 Memmi has noted the profound
ambivalence that permeates the colonial project: How could the colonizer look
after his workers while periodically gunning down a crowd of the colonized? For
the colonizer, to think about the contradictions inherent in colonialism was
to undermine it. The panoply of legislation and the activities of scholars represented
a mechanism for the colonizers to grant themselves self-absolution.
This image of a smoothly functioning social order creates the capacity for fascist
self-delusion. As Erving Goffman has noted:
A performer may be taken in by his own act, convinced at the moment that the
impression of reality which he fosters is the one and only reality. In such cases
the performer comes to be his own audience; he comes to be performer and observer of
the same show. Presumably he intracepts or incorporates the standards he attempts to
maintain in the presence of others so that his conscience requires him to act in a socially
proper way. It will have been necessary for the individual in his performing capacity to
conceal from himself in his audience capacity the discreditable facts he has had to learn
about the performance; in everyday terms, there will be things he knows, or has known,
that he will not be able to tell himself.92
Recht Machen mit Rechtsstaat (Making Right with a Rechtsstaat)
Settlement involves not only physical movement but also a psychic domain: angst and
other anxieties must be allayed for settlers to be settled. Law is crucial in this
operation, creating what Ju¨rgen Habermas has termed ‘‘facticity.’’93 Settlers, while in
a position of domination, suffer the unbearable powerlessness of ‘‘waiting’’94 and
seek to stabilize their situation through the magical use of law. As an ideology, law
contributes to the social construction of the social world by creating images of social
relationships as natural and fair to the settlers because they are endowed with
legality.
The emphasis on the instrumentality of legislation has diverted attention from the
contradictions inherent in it. We must look not only at what the law says but also
at what it does. In particular, the cultural and attendant ‘‘moral’’ meanings of this
legislation have been ignored. The 1907 Native Regulations were important for the
settlers not only on an instrumental level but also on a symbolic level. For the first
time, the distinction between ‘‘whites’’ and ‘‘indigenes’’ was legally recognized,95 and
thus the issue of sovereignty was touched upon. Sovereignty is not about determining
the law but about determining who is exempt from it, as Giorgio Agamben has
argued.96 But there are two types of exemptions: first, those whereby those with power
can ignore the law and foist their will upon the less powerful; and, second, those
whereby the vulnerable and less powerful are defined as beyond the law, as Vogelfrei
(literally, ‘‘free birds’’). The latter is obvious, if frequently overlooked, in von Trotha’s
infamous ‘‘extermination order,’’ the very first sentence of which is ‘‘you have ceased to
be German subjects’’—the implication being that, as non–German subjects, they are
beyond the realm and protection of German law. This idea meshed well with the
German jurisprudential notion of Rechtsstaat (roughly translated as ‘‘constitutional
state’’), which, essentially, makes everyone equal who is subjugated by the same
law within the bounds of the state. According to the Native Regulations, indigenes
without labor contracts were without legal rights and could be punished as vagrants.
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It also validated the ability of settlers to engage in private policing. The Musterstaat
survived by franchising its legal use of violence to its settlers.
Authorization or legality displaced legitimacy as a key concern. In the
Schutzgebiet, as in apartheid South Africa, oppression occurred not so much through
terror per se as by the routinization of terror in day-to-day interaction. ‘‘Lumping it’’
(ignoring the state officials) or ‘‘redressive self-help’’ (do-it-yourself justice) were
apparently common settler strategies on the outlying farms, especially in the
Grootfontein and Outjo Districts.97 Indeed, these strategies led to a sub-genre of
German colonial literature, epitomized most notably by Hans Grimm, author of the
influential Nazi-era bestseller Volk ohne Raum (‘‘A People without Space’’). Such
misguided settler self-help was not seen as mistreatment but justified as ‘‘discipline’’
(Zu¨chtigung).
Another level at which the Rechtsstaat played a role was the quality of the formal
judicial structure. Even while en route to Swakopmund from Germany, General von
Trotha issued orders empowering every commanding officer to suspend preliminary
judicial proceedings and to shoot any enemy. Other ‘‘colored’’ inhabitants, if suspected,
were to be tried by field courts.98
In 1912 a Dr. Mu¨ller complained in the Reichstag,
Our civil and military administration of justice is simply indefensible. . .. With regard to
native justice and administration there exists an incredible uncertainty concerning the
powers of the administrative authorities. . . . One judge uses the German penal code
without further ado. . . . Another does not use the penal code at all. In short, our criminal
proceedings leave the natives entirely without rights.99
The courts were lenient when forced to take action against settlers for killing
indigenes; homicides were invariably justified as ‘‘accidental’’ or as necessary for
‘‘public safety.’’100 Settlers frequently justified their own actions and mistreatment of
indigenes by referring to the actions of von Trotha and other (quasi-)legal officials.
In Namibia, Harry Schwirck concludes, ‘‘a whole legal discourse and law itself enabled
rather than restrained colonial abuse.’’101
Bleibt da etwas anderes ubrig als Erschiessen? Soft alternatives
to genocide?
The infamous 1911 Verordnungen were not the result of a unanimous decision. Rather,
policy makers had to accommodate different stakeholders, and the results must be
seen as part of a larger policy debate about the ‘‘Bushman Danger,’’ which drew upon
historical and ‘‘scientific precedent’’ and which produced three options in addition
to direct extermination. The first of these involved ‘‘cleansing’’ the area by deporting
captured Bushmen to the coast or driving them into the vast sandy waterless area to
the northeast of Grootfontein, known as the Kaukauveldt (an area deemed unsuitable
for European settlement). This was the option favored by many settlers. A second
option was to ‘‘civilize’’ Bushmen by habituating them to work. This option was given
lip service by occasional settlers but did not form part of settler ideology; on the
contrary, settlesr were very suspicious of attempts to link education with labor
laws.102The main proponents of this option appear to have been missionaries and some
humanitarian-oriented officials. The third option was the creation of special
‘‘reserves’’—what were known in Europe as ‘‘ghettoes’’—for Bushmen. In a sense,
this was a compromise favored by officials as a way to circumvent criticism from the
metropole, even though most believed it to be unworkable, given the Bushmen’s
alleged inherent Wanderlust.
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The reserve option was given official credence in a memorandum drafted by
Dr. Seibert, the government’s chief medical officer:
[Bushmen] are unsuitable as settled employees, and the relinquishment of their
nomadic lifestyle spells their doom. While they are of little economic value, they are
of large scientific value. And even the Cameroons have a law, which protects gorillas
by placing them in reserves.103
Copies of Seibert’s letter were sent to all the relevant district heads for comment;
all the comments were negative, with the notable exception of those of Beringar von
Zastrow, the Grootfontein Bezirkamtmann (district head), in this case supported by
the farmer-dominated Grootfontein District Council, which had requested that all
‘‘non-working’’ (?!) Bushmen be placed on a reserve. Von Zastrow felt that the area
northeast of Grootfonetin, beyond the police zone (an area settlers could only enter
with special permits), already constituted a de facto reserve. Objections raised by the
other Bezirkamtma¨nner included the following: that reservations would lead to a
concentration of stock thieves and vagabonds; that it was impossible to keep the
Bushmen within a demarcated area; that the landscape would be damanged through
their hunting methods and veldt-fires; and that this policy would hinder efforts to
educate ‘‘Bushmen through labor.’’ The Maltaho¨he Bezirkamtmann characteristically
replied that it was debatable whether there were any full-blooded Bushmen left, and a
reserve would simply be a hiding place for runaway servants. Bushmen had excellent
potential to serve as herd-boys. He concluded that
[a] wild animal (or gorilla) can be held captive for breeding in which case the race would
not become extinct by the process of natural selection. It is not possible to hold a
Namib Bushman captive because they are still human beings, but they have no pride
in their race, in fact they are without racial consciousness.104
His Outjo colleague argued that the scientific value of the Bushmen was minor
compared to the security threat they posed to Owambo contract workers and white
settlers.
The notion of a reserve was first mooted in 1906, when the prominent Berlin
ethnologist Felix von Luschan suggested the creation of a South African Bushman
reserve in the ‘‘interest of science.’’105 The Deutsche Kolonialzeitung took up the theme,
arguing that the suggestion was also applicable to Namibia.106 The Kalahari was the
last asylum of the ‘‘vertreibenen Ureinwohner [expelled Aboriginals].’’ The following
year, Lt. P. Gentz, an officer with many years’ field experience, made a strong plea:
With the death-knell of these people ringing, one wishes that there was a reserve for
them, as there are for the lazy Herero and Hottentots. A reserve where they can live
in peace and where they can maintain their lifestyle so important for scholarly
research.107
Most officials with experience in Grootfontein, including von Zastrow and
Hauptmann Mu¨ller, felt that a Bushman reserve already existed, created by the
Bushmen themselves, in the Kaukauveld, but that forcibly moving Bushmen there was
problematic not for ethical or ethnographic reasons, such as infringing on the territory
of others, but—as Mu¨ller put it in 1912—because ‘‘I have never heard of anyone being
successful at driving jackals before dogs.’’108
At present, data are scanty, but it is surely more than coincidental that, at the time
when missionary Heinrich Vedder of the Rhenish Missionary Society and von Zastrow
the Grootfontein Bezirkamtmann were expressing concern about the wholesale
decimation of Bushmen, Reinhard Mumm, a leader of the Moral Purity Movement
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and recently elected member of the Reichstag, made an eloquent plea for a reserve for
the ‘‘poorest of the poor . . . the slaves of the slaves.’’ Bushmen, he claimed, were a
product of a tragic history, dispossessed by farmers and railroad companies and
riddled with venereal disease. As a reserve, Mumm suggested the area stretching from
the Grootfontein farms to the Kavango River. He repeated his call for a Bushman
reserve in 1914.109 While Mumm’s plea did not have much impact, it is clear that there
was an important information network linking the colony to the metropole.
The issue of whether Bushmen could be ‘‘habituated’’ to work also provoked much
discussion among academics. The academic who provided the immediate reference
point for the debate was the geographer Siegfried Passarge who, in 1907, published a
compilation of his contributions to theMitteilungen aus des deutsches Schutzgebiets as
a book. His research was based on a sojourn of a few months in the Kalahari on an
expedition led by Lord Lugard and accompanied by a Dutch-speaking Bushman. Most
of his information was derived from white traders or Bechuanas, since he found it
difficult to get information directly from Bushmen: ‘‘Nothing is more changeable,
undependable, and unpredictable than the character of the Bushman; it combines
within itself the greatest imaginable contrasts, virtues, and vices.’’110 As a race,
Bushmen were on a closed development path, he claimed; they were incapable of
adapting to agriculture or pastoralism. Passarge concluded that the only viable policy,
in a settlement situation, was extermination:
What can the civilized human manage to do with people who stand at the level of that
sheep stealer? Jail and the correctional house would be a reward, and besides do not
even exist in that country. Does any possibility exist other than shooting them?111
Passarge’s efforts were sufficient to get him appointed, in 1908, to the inaugural Chair
of Geography at the Hamburger Kolonial-Institut, the only geography department
devoted solely to colonial geography.
Franz Seiner, an Austrian geographer, also participated in this discussion.
He argued that adult male Bushmen were incorrigible, and thus best deported from
the area where captured. The way to make Bushmen into reliable laborers was to start
with the children and re-socialize them from an early age, divorced from their
traditional milieu and from their parents. Bushmen were in no danger of extermina-
tion by farmers, he argued, because they had a vast ‘‘natural reserve’’ in the Kalahari.
At the same time, Seiner felt that if women were placed on settler farms they would
begin miscegenating with local blacks, leading to an overall superior labor force. He
suggested that all the northern Bushmen—that is, those north of Grootfontein—were
‘‘Bastard Bushmen’’ (hybrids), and thus not an Urrace worthy of protection.112
In reality, as Lydia Ho¨pker’s memoir attests, all these options were being practiced
simulanteously. Bushmen were hunted, shot, and driven out of their areas, and their
children were press-ganged into serving as cheap labor for farmers. Many officials
used the belief that the Bushmen were already a ‘‘Bastard race’’ to argue against any
need to ‘‘preserve’’ them.
Seiner’s and Passarge’s were not isolated academic voices. On the contrary, we
should consider, for example, the remarks made by Leonard Schultze, a renowned
geographer-anthropologist with extensive field experience in both Namibia and
New Guinea. Schultze’s study of the Nama113 is widely regarded as definitive, and
he coined the term ‘‘Khoisan,’’ which lumps ‘‘Bushmen’’ and ‘‘Khoi’’(or Nama) together.
Schultze undertook his research in Namibia during the notorious wars of 1904–1907.
He profusely acknowledged the assistance given by General von Trotha, lauded as a
fellow Naturforscher (natural scientist). Indeed, Schultze accompanied the German
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troops in their last great flanking movement, which led to the death of Nama leader
Hendrik Witbooi, and then accompanied Hauptmann Ludwig von Estorff in his famous
tracking expedition, which pursued fleeing Nama and their allies to Rietfontein in the
southern Kalahari. Obviously the war situation restricted his travels, and his research
was carried out only in a small part of southern Namibia. The sample on which his
famous classification is based was neither random nor large; it consisted of measuring
twenty-six people in Walvis Bay and the rest, some fifty prisoners, almost exclusively
in Keetmanshoop. Schultze measured some ninety characteristics, including such
arcana as breast circumference, while the genitalia of his twelve female subjects
enjoyed special emphasis. Six people measured in southern Botswana (Lehututu or
Letlake Pan), together with three Namib Bushmen, constituted the ‘‘Bushman’’
sample. Given what we know about naming practices and theories of the time, it seems
likely that his ‘‘Bushmen’’ were impoverished ‘‘Nama,’’ and thus his new term simply
reinforced conventional dogma.114 There was economic value in such ‘‘lumping.’’ A few
years after undertaking fieldwork that led to this formulation, he inveighed as follows:
The ethnologist may lament the fact that a portion of humanity with such strongly
developed characteristics as displayed by the tribes of German South West Africa . . .
will one day become wholly melted down in order to be put into circulation again as
common day labor coin, stamped with the imperial eagle and the Christian cross, with
the inscription ‘‘colored laborer,’’ to constitute an economic value. But the struggle for
our own existence allows no other solution. At the same time, work is the only solution
for them: he who doesn’t want to work perishes here with us as well; we have no reason
to be more sentimental in Africa than in Europe. We who build our houses on the graves
of those races must, however, take twice as seriously our obligation to avoid
no sacrifices for the purposes of civilization, that is, for the greater development of
all means of existence in this new land.115
Given such a Weltanschauung, Schultze’s views on Bushmen are not surprising.
He considered them the lowest of the low:
If we consider the natives according to their value as cultural factors in the
protectorate, then one race is immediately eliminated: the Bushmen. The Bushman
lacks entirely the precondition of any cultural development: the drive to create something
beyond everyday needs, to secure or permanently to improve systematically the
conditions of existence, even the most primitive ones like the procurement of food. In
the course of centuries he has come into contact with cultures of all levels; in conflict
with them he has often enough had the knife put to his throat; tireless missionaries
have attempted to save him from such struggle, to protect and to join him as the modest
member to a civilized community; but the Bushman has always run away. He feels
better out in the Sandveld behind a windscreen of thin-leaf thornbush than in a solidly
built house with a full pot and regular work—as long as he is free. Colonists cannot
count on such people; they let them live as long as at least they do no damage. But when
they do not fulfill this requirement, they have been killed off like predatory game. The
idea has been considered to preserve the Bushmen in reservations as the last remnants
of the primordial past of the human race, just as elsewhere attempts are made to save
endangered animal species. But we will not be able to afford the luxury of leaving fallow
the required land areas and everything else which man requires for the maintenance of
the species without inbreeding.116
Even scholars defined as ‘‘liberal’ supported this view. Paul Rohrbach, for example,
suggested that ‘‘in Africa the extermination or the decay of the natives is impossible,
excepting perhaps the few Bushmen in the southwest who at present are giving us
serious trouble.’’117 To be sure, there was some criticism of this position from the
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slightly more liberal anthropologists centered around the Zeitschrift fu¨r Ethnologie in
Berlin, who in 1914 published von Zastrow’s 1912 memorandum dismissing proposals
calling for ‘‘shooting or deporting whole tribes as so absurd as not to deserve any
consideration’’118 and opted instead for economic integration and education. But this
was decidedly a minority view. More typical was George McCall Theal, the leading
South African historian, who carefully studied the available evidence and concluded
in 1919,
It can now be asserted in positive language that the Bushmen were incapable of
adopting European civilization. . .. To this day there has not been a single instance of a
Bushman of pure blood having permanently adopted the habits of the white man.119
The relative importance of science and the practice of science in Germany vis-a`-vis
other colonial powers should be noted. German anthropology dominated its English
and French counterparts; as early as 1885, von Luschan could already boast that the
‘‘Berlin collection is seven times as big as the ethnographic department of the British
Museum.’’ As late as 1920, with Germany stripped of its colonial possessions,
the Berlin Gesellschaft fu¨r Anthropologie, Ethnologie und Urgeschichte had more
members than the Royal Anthropological Institute and the American Anthropological
Association combined. Even smaller German societies outdrew their British and US
counterparts. In 1906, the Vienna Anthropological Society, for example, could claim
459 members.120 Given the mandarinate nature of German academe, this meant in
practice that academic and scientific pronouncements enjoyed a much wider currency
and authority in Germany than in the other metropolitan centers. Even critics
of colonialism, such as Moritz Bonn, conceded that German scientific colonialism was
more advanced than the British or French versions. It is within this context that one
can appreciate von Luschan’s claim that he was ‘‘entirely convinced that our late war
in South-West Africa might have been avoided, and that it was simply the result of
neglect of the teachings of ethnology on the part of leading officials.’’121
Certainly officials took scholars seriously. In November 1912, Franz Seiner wrote a
letter concerning Bushman prisoners to the colonial secretary and enclosed photo-
graphs to illustrate his point about their mistreatment. His letter was forwarded
to Governor Seitz for comment. Ten months later, after investigating the matter,
the governor replied that he had no doubt that, if published, Seiner’s photographs
would provide ‘‘unpleasant agitation material against the Territorial administration.’’
He then added, in a trope familiar to science, that
a more objective view of the situation must take into account the fact that the Bushmen
are by no means only harmless children of nature, but constitute a serious danger to
more intensive settlement of the fertile northern districts. Weakness cannot therefore
be justified by any means in the treatment of the Bushmen.122
These photographs are important—indeed, damning—for what is not discussed in the
resulting correspondence. Two of the prisoners have amputated arms; this was a
common way of dealing with Bushman ‘‘theft,’’ yet neither then nor later did such
practices merit discussion, let alone criticism.123
While sweating at their uneconomical smallholdings in the Grootfontein district,
many inexperienced and underfinanced settlers projected their wildest fantasies upon
the ‘‘vagabond Bushmen,’’ and their fantasies often meshed with those of academics.
The same can be seen in the numerous reports written by officers and officials that
were published in quasi-academic journals. With the exception of Seiner, the scholars
whose material and ideas were so eagerly read and used by officials and settlers were
Genocide Studies and Prevention 4:1 April 2009
46
not in Namibia during the period when these Bushmen ‘‘hunts’’ were carried out.
They were still involved in Bushman issues, but they seem to have been exclusively
concerned with Bushman penises! A major question troubling some of the finest
scholars was how to distinguish between ‘‘Bushmen’’ and ‘‘Hottentots.’’ Craniometrical
differences between the two were insignificant, and thus the issue had to be resolved
by other means. Within a few years the focus had shifted to penises as the
differentiating trait. Especially influential were Seiner’s research on and photographs
of Bushman prisoners; Seiner argued that the semi-erect penis of the Bushman was a
distinctive racial characteristic and that Bushmen could be identified by the angle of
the penis: ‘‘Exceptionally interesting is the circumstance that Bushmen do not have
pendular penises like the other human races, but are in non-aroused circumstances
horizontal like four-footed mammals.’’124
So intense was the debate over the Bushman/Hottentot distinction that Eugen
Fischer, later to achieve a certain notoriety in Nazi Germany, wrote to Governor Seitz
in 1913 requesting a Bushman penis. His letter contains detailed instructions about
how to preserve the organ and the suggestion that if the governor had a condemned
Bushman, the prisoner could be sent to Freiburg, where the cold climate would soon
kill him and the good professor would have a fresh cadaver to work on. Bushmen’s
genitalia seem to have transfixed many physical anthropologists, and this fascination
continued to be a popular trope in German physical anthropology. Fischer, too,
associated the genitalia of Bushmen with attributed animality. Genitalia were seen as
clinching their intercalary role between humans and animals—a belief that lasted into
the 1950s.125
Seiner appears to have played a key role not only in stimulating this debate but
also in directly and indirectly influencing official policy on Bushmen. Indeed, a closer
reading of newspaper headlines featuring ‘‘The Bushman Danger’’ or ‘‘The Bushman
Plague’’ indicates that all seem to be traceable to Seiner’s pen. Some felt that his claims
were exaggerated—so much so that Seiner tried to sue an experienced settler
newspaper editor and member of the Landesrat, Rudolf Kindt, for libel after the latter
accused him of presenting reports laced with fantasy. Kindt obtained sworn
statements from Pater Bierfort, a Catholic missionary on the Kavango River, who
pointed out Seiner’s numerous elementary linguistic faux pas. Other expert witnesses
testified to Seiner’s ‘‘u¨bernervoes’’ and overanxious state: he was prone to take
exception to the smallest thing, and once punished his bambuse (factotum) with
twenty-five lashes. Bierfort, who served as Seiner’s interpreter, called his article
on the ‘‘Bushman Danger’’ pure ‘‘invention.’’126 Seiner left the country before the case
was settled. The fact that other observers disputed his claims of danger raises an
intriguing question: Were Seiner’s (and, indeed, Passarge’s) statements about
Bushmen based on scientific observation, or were they generated from his interactions
with settlers, and, having been given scholarly credibibility, did they then return
to reinforce settlers’ fantasies and nightmares? This interpretation seems not only
possible but likely.
Conclusion
What was a small war for Germany was genocide for Bushmen. E´mile Durkheim’s
distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions, first made in his classic study
Suicide, is useful in examining this genocide. Sufficient conditions relate to intent
(typically phrased in terms of policy), the focus of liberal analyses, while necessary
conditions relate to structural features necessary for the genocide to occur.127
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These conditions are not mutually exclusive but must be analyzed synthetically, since
the problem in examining colonial genocide is not to explain it so much as to
understand the variations that occur. As I have pointed out, structurally German
South West Africa was a classic case of Marxian ‘‘primitive accumulation’’ or Weberian
‘‘booty capitalism.’’ Seeing the situation as one of resource competition would appear
attractive. Ecological pressure most certainly might have been a factor: as well as
settlers’ having moved into Bushman territory, 1910 had also been a bad drought year,
with only 42% of the average annual rainfall.128 The fact that four of the following five
rainy seasons also saw below-average rainfall aggravated the situation. In addition,
the 1907 proclamation of the Etosha Game Park, in prime Bushman territory north of
Grootfontein, and 1908 proclamations outlawing hunting out of season or without a
written license conceivably added to the pressure. The Blue Book detailing Germany’s
treatment of the indigenes cites approvingly an earlier official report dealing with
Bushmen in the northern Cape in which Major J. Herbst (secretary for South West
Africa at the time of the Blue Book) states that ‘‘the strict enforcement of the game
laws has made the country unsafe for them. They profess to be unable to understand
by what right Government protects the game and invariably ask to be shown the
government brand on the animals.’’129
The problem with the ecological approach is that this was a case of genocide by
long-term stealth. Bushmen, farmers, and officials occupied different ecological niches
on the same terrain, and thus were not in direct or immediate competition. Rather, as
in other parts of the Kalahari, a symbiosis emerged, and direct resource competition
became an issue only much later. With respect to the game laws, it is obvious that state
forces were thinly spread and had little chance of implementing these laws.
Theories on colonial genocides, those situations of brute ‘‘booty capitalism’’
or ‘‘primitive accumulation,’’ often ignore the importance of demographics and of
psychologically pacifying settlers. In Namibia the settlers were spread thinly and came
from a strong German tradition. Had they been less ‘‘tradition-bound,’’ they would
probably have sought their fortunes in regions beyond German hegemony. In pacifying
the colonizers, ceremonialism, and particularly the Rechtsstaat, played an important
role. This emphasis fits the facts well and complements Isobel Hull’s recent argument
about the role of German military culture (understood as a complex of habitual
practices and basic assumptions embedded in its doctrines and administration).130 In
addition, German society valued the opinions of scholars to a far higher degree than
other Europeans did. Indeed, the structure of both academia and the military had
strong nationalistic overtones. This had important implications in facilitating the
Bushman genocides.
Perhaps one of the most insightful analyses, not only linking Germany’s colonial
experiences with the rise of the Nazis but also delving into the nature of genocide, is
that of Moritz Bonn, who, unlike Hannah Arendt and other intellectuals, actually had
first-hand experience of the colonies. An unpublished, undated paper titled ‘‘End of the
Colonial Discussion’’ (probably written in the 1930s, when Bonn was in exile) provides
the following analysis:
[Nazis] accept and amplify the racial theories by which General von Trotha had
justified his policy of extirpating the rebellious Hereros by making them die of thirst in
the Omaheke desert:—that according to the law of nature inferior races must die out
when brought in contact with superior races. The Nazi creed is based on the same cheap
conception of Darwinism, and like their colonial predecessors, they do not believe in the
unaided working of this supposed law of nature[.]
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The great Nordic race, as represented by Nazism, cannot defend itself against the
Jews by its own superior values, except by closing all avenues of a living to them and by
stealing their money. They are now doing on a much larger scale to the Jews what had
been intended as punishment for the Hereros. The Hereros had undoubtedly rebelled—
though they had been sorely tried—they murdered many German settlers; they had
successfully outmaneuvered the rather theatrical German Army chief, who was
ignorant of aboriginal warfare and in his wrath decided to inflict collective destruction
on those who would not play the game of war in accordance with scientific rules. The
Nazis hold German Jewry collectively responsible for the criminal act of a non-German
Jew, who their own brutality had goaded into frenzied crime. His evil deed served
them as a pretext, for a policy of expropriating, Jewish property . . . the Commander in
South West Africa had hidden himself behind the law of nature in order to justify his
brutal reprisals; the Nazis are trying, as they have done all the time, to dress up their
arbitrary, violent acts in the form of legality . . .
As long as they express such doctrines there should be no discussion of returning the
colonies because to them justice is not an ethical conception, but a mere legal quibble.
Germany must learn that recognition of the right of self-determination for a majority
does not include the right of extermination of an alien minority.131
This unpublished document is cited for a number of reasons. To begin with, it
establishes that Bonn rather than Arendt was the first to see the connection between
the colonial experience and the rise of Nazi totalitarianism.132 There may be a
connection between colonialism and totalitarianism, as Arendt suggested, but it is
necessary to note that the critique of totalitarianism may also have some colonial roots,
as in Bonn’s case. Bonn’s central insight, however, is to highlight the importance of the
manipulation of legal ideology in setting the stage for genocide, directing attention to
the importance of the Rechtsstaat.
In this case, the Rechtsstaat facilitated two outcomes. First, it franchised coercive
power to settlers while at the same time empowering them psychologically. It had
magical qualities. Rohrbach, formerly settlement commissioner for German South
West Africa, complained, ‘‘The conviction has gained ground that without the formality
of the law and the juristic atmosphere of our high Prussian-German officials, nobody
can administer anything.’’133 Nevertheless, such formality was a crucial factor in
giving settlers a self-confidence that, Rohrbach believed, rendered them ‘‘spiritually
more effective than any average million of people at home.’’134 Second, the Rechtsstaat
attempted to create a supply of pliable labor by removing key elements of the
means of production from a sizeable number of indigenes, especially Herero and
Khoekhoegowab-speakers, by confiscating their lands and livestock and then
attempting to tie them down to colonial employers through the permit system.
Indigenes not on the reservations or carrying a pass were defined as criminal and
punished as vagrants. Bushmen by definition, then, were vagrants and subject to
punishment.
Justification for the Labor Regulations was couched in two ways: as a senior
official told Colonial Secretary Dernberg during his visit to Windhoek, ‘‘If the natives
ever become rich in cattle again, the safety of the country will be threatened.’’ It was
equally important that settlers, officials, and scholars shared a dominant view that
the object of the laws was to create an indigenous proletarian working class.135
The official rhetoric of this milieu is rife with references to indigenes as ‘‘economic
use units,’’ as in Schultze’s twisted phraseology, mentioned above, about the
circulation of common labor coin stamped with the Imperial eagle and the Christian
cross. Similarly, Rohrbach believed that indigenes had rights only if they could prove
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that they could work.136 In his popular Herero war novel, Peter Mohr’s Fahrt nach
Su¨dwest Afrika, Gustav Frenssen has one of his soldiers exclaim, ‘‘These blacks
deserved to be killed in the eyes of God and men; not because they murdered two
hundred farmers and rose up against us in rebellion, but because they built no houses
and dug no wells.’’137 The attributes of Bushmen epitomized the critical distinction
between Herero and Bushman: in the hierarchical typology developed by academics,
Bushmen ranked even below Herero and Nama because, it was alleged, they had no
property. It is not enough to recognize this hierarchy as neo-Darwinian; crucially, we
must consider the basis on which the hierarchy was constructed. According to many
colonials, Bushmen were Vogelfrei, precisely because they owned no property or had
laws. Their alleged incapacity to work was also tied to notions of property. Most
importantly, having no property meant that their territory was seen as Herrenlos, or
terra nullius, and thus available for the taking by settlers.138
For all the problems settlers claimed to have with them as workers, Herero and
Nama could still be massaged into the system by manipulating their love of
livestock.139 While indigenes were prohibited from owning livestock, farmers used
this love as a means of ensuring labor. According to the Landesrat, indigenes owned
about 25% of all small stock and more than 20,000 head of cattle.140 Most of this
stock ownership was ‘‘informal,’’ facilitated by settlers, since officially, between 1911
and 1914, the governor received only thirty-four applications for such licenses and
approved thirty.141 Bushmen, believed to have no concept of property or wealth, could
not be manipulated in this way, which gave emphasis to their ‘‘worthlessness’’ in
settlers’ eyes. As foragers, they were not dependent upon their colonial masters and
could ‘‘drop out’’ or disengage from the colonial economy when they wanted to. This
fact also facilitated the settlers’ ability to project their worst fantasies and nightmares
onto the Bushmen and explains why Bushmen served as convenient scapegoats to
cover the incompetence of novice, and invariably underfunded, farmers. The Bushmen
could not be controlled or integrated, and thus they had little ‘‘economic value.’’
While much effort has been expended in understanding that coterie of genocides
known variously as ‘‘frontier’’ or ‘‘colonial’’ genocides, one of the major problems
underlying these efforts is the issue of false comparisons. Invariably, the comparison is
between Herero and Australian Aborigines. Alison Palmer, for example, distinguishes
between ‘‘state’’ and ‘‘societal’’ genocides, the former referring to the Herero and
the latter to Queensland, where genocide was not the product of direct state policy but,
rather, the result of settler vigilantism tolerated by a state that lacked the resources to
impose its will on the settlers.142 As the Bushman case shows, however, the boundaries
between state and societal genocides are rather blurred. A comparison between the
genocides of the Bushmen and of the Aborigines suggests several important
similarities. Not only were both groups foragers living in mobile small groups with
no clear-cut hierarchy, both had to deal with a sparse, mostly male, settler population.
In terms of intellectual classifications concerning humans, it is no accident that, going
back to the ‘‘Great Chain of Being,’’ the two groups that were seen as most primitive
were the Aborigines and the Bushmen.143
Perhaps the most important recent contribution to understanding colonial
genocides has been that of Ju¨rgen Zimmerer,144 who elaborates on Palmer’s insights
to make the case that such genocides occurred by way of pre-modern and incompletely
bureaucratized states that could not control their unruly citizens (thus paving the way
for vigilante action) and, at most, could only produce massacres, since they did not
have the requisite organizational complexity. Zimmerer’s analysis raises an important
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question: How does one understand the end of the Bushman genocide that occurred
when the South Africans took over? Certainly the Afrikaner settlers who slowly but
surely supplanted the German settlers were believed to be far more racist, even in
German times,145 and the first South African administrators were notoriously
unsympathetic toward Bushmen. Administrator A.J. Werth, for example, asserted
that
We make no attempt to civilize the Bushmen. They are untameable. . . . The territory is
so large and the Bushmen so cunning that an army might seek them in vain. But it is all
fine country, splendid for sheep and cattle farming . . .146
In addition, the territory had undergone significant, if not massive, de-bureau-
cratization. In 1923, the administrator complained that the administration consisted of
only 311 officials, of whom 212 were temporary employees, and that there were
massive morale problems because of anomalies in pay and allowances. (In contrast,
1,226 German officials were deported.) Similarly, the police force decreased from
440 European and 330 native police to 284 European and 239 native police in 1923,
while the number of police stations decreased from 113 to thirty-nine.147 Poor quality
of personnel and woeful under-financing of transport was a constant administrative
refrain—a situation conducive to vigilante-style actions against Bushmen, one would
expect.
Bushman numbers belie the facile explanation that they had already been ‘‘tamed’’
by then. Nor is there any evidence that they were negatively affected by the great
influenza epidemic of 1918. Three factors, I suggest, may be significant. The first
relates to the notion of Rechtsstaat. For all the brute racism of the South African
regime, there was no Rechtsstaat that could promote the grown of fascist self-delusion.
Second, the South Africans deported most of the recent German settlers and left the
alte Afrikaner who, like the racist but experienced Boers, realized that they had to live
with the consequences of their actions and could not expect much state support.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the South Africans did not want to be
embarrassed at the League of Nations. They had painted the Germans as barbaric in
making their claim for a Mandate, and thus could not afford to be accused in their turn
of ‘‘barbaric atrocities.’’ The so-called Bondelswarts Affair of 1922 had been a source of
acute international mortification. The way in which the South African administration
responded to even the most vague accusation that might reflect on their reputation as
a competent Mandatory authority always seemed to involve a high-powered
investigation and spin-doctoring.148 Public embarrassment by way of a free press, as
a potential deterrent to atrocity, had already demonstrated its potential in Germany.
Now it flowered. Clearly, the international politics of embarrassment as a means of
genocide prevention can work in unanticipated ways.
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